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Abstract
Recently, the physical layer security (PLS) of the communication systems has been shown to be
enhanced by using legal receiver’s feedback. The present secret key based feedback scheme mainly
focuses on producing key from the feedback and using this key to protect part of the transmitted
message. However, this feedback scheme has been proved only optimal for several degraded cases. The
broadcast channel with mutual secrecy requirement (BC-MSR) is important as it constitutes the essence
of physical layer security (PLS) in the down-link of the wireless communication systems. In this paper,
we investigate the feedback effects on the BC-MSR, and propose two inner bounds and one outer bound
on the secrecy capacity region of the BC-MSR with noiseless feedback. One inner bound is constructed
according to the already existing secret key based feedback coding scheme for the wiretap channel, and
the other is constructed by a hybrid coding scheme using feedback to generate not only keys protecting
the transmitted messages but also cooperative messages helping the receivers to improve their decoding
performance. The performance of the proposed feedback schemes and the gap between the inner and
outer bounds are further explained via two examples.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Besides reliability, introducing an additional secrecy criteria into a physically degraded 1
broadcast channel, Wyner [1] first studied the secure transmission over the wiretap channel
(WTC). Later, on the basis of [1], Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2] studied the WTC without the “physi-
cally degraded” assumption and with an additional common message available at both the legal
receiver and the wiretapper. The outstanding work [1]-[2] reveals the reliability-security trade-off
of the communication channels in the presence of a wiretapper. The follow-up study of the WTC
mainly focuses on the multi-user channel in the presence of a wiretapper (e.g. multiple-access
wiretap channel [3], [4], relay-eavesdropper channel [5], [6], broadcast wiretap channel [7], [8],
two way wiretap channel [9], [10], etc.), and the multi-terminal security, see [11]-[15].
In recent years, the effect of legal receiver’s feedback on the PLS of communication channels
attracts a lot of attention. For the WTC with noiseless feedback (WTC-NF), Ahlswede and Cai
[16] pointed out that to enhance the secrecy capacity of the WTC, the best use of the legal
receiver’s feedback channel output is to generate random bits from it and use these bits as a
key by the transmitter protecting part of the transmitted message. Using this secret key based
feedback scheme, Ahlswede and Cai [16] determined the secrecy capacity of the physically
degraded WTC-NF, and the secrecy capacity of the general WTC-NF has not been determined
yet. On the basis of [16], Ardestanizadeh et al. investigated the WTC with rate limited feedback
[17] where the legal receiver is free to use the noiseless feedback channel to send anything as
he wishes (up to a rate Rf ). For the degraded case, they showed that the best choice of the
legal receiver is sending a key through the feedback channel, and if the legal receiver’s channel
output Y1 is sent, the best use of it is to extract a key. Later, Schaefer et al. [18] extended the
work of [17] to a broadcast situation, where two legitimate receivers of the broadcast channel
independently sent their secret keys to the transmitter via two noiseless feedback channels, and
these keys help to increase the achievable secrecy rate region of the broadcast wiretap channel
[7]. Cohen er al. [19] generalized Ardestanizadeh et al.’s work [17] by considering the WTC with
noiseless feedback, and with causal channel state information (CSI) at both the transmitter and
the legitimate receiver. Cohen er al. [19] showed that the transmitted message can be protected
by two keys, where one is generated from the noiseless feedback, and the other is generated by
the causal CSI. They further showed that these two keys increases the achievable secrecy rate
1The “physically degraded” indicates that the wiretapper’s received signal is a degraded version of the legal receiver’s.
3of the WTC with rate limited feedback [17]. Other related works in the WTC with noiseless
feedback and CSI are investigated in [20]-[21]. Here note that for the WTC-NF, the present
literature ([16]-[21]) shows that the secrecy capacity is achieved only for the degraded case,
i.e., Ahlswede and Cai’s secret key based feedback coding scheme [16] is only optimal for the
degraded channel models. Finding the optimal feedback coding scheme for the general channel
models needs us to exploit other uses of the feedback.
The broadcast channel with mutual secrecy requirement (BC-MSR) is an important model for
the PLS in the down-link of the wireless communication systems. The already existing literature
[12], [13] provides inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of BC-MSR. To
investigate the feedback effects on the BC-MSR (see Figure 1), in this paper, two feedback
strategies for the BC-MSR are proposed. One is an extension of the already existing secret
key based feedback scheme for the WTC [16], and the other is a hybrid coding scheme using
the feedback to generate not only keys but also cooperative messages helping the receivers to
improve their decoding performance. Two inner bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the
feedback model shown in Figure 1 are constructed with respect to the proposed two feedback
coding schemes. Moreover, for comparison, we also provide a corresponding outer bound. These
inner and outer bounds are further illustrated via two examples (a Dueck type example and a
Blackwell type example).
Fig. 1: The broadcast channel with noiseless feedback and mutual secrecy requirement
Now the remiander of this paper is organized as follows. Necessary mathematical background,
the previous non-feedback coding scheme for the BC-MSR and a generalized Wyner-Ziv coding
scheme are provided in Section II. Section III is for the model formulation and the main results.
4Section IV shows the details about the proof of the main results. Two examples and numerical
results are shown in Section V, and a summary of this work is given in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations and Basic Lemmas
Notations: For the rest of this paper, the random variables (RVs), values and alphabets are
written in uppercase letters, lowercase letters and calligraphic letters, respectively. The random
vectors and their values are denoted by a similar convention. For example, Y1 represents a RV,
and y1 represents a value in Y1. Similarly, Y N1 represents a random N -vector (Y1,1, ..., Y1,N),
and yN1 = (y1,1, ..., y1,N) represents a vector value in YN1 (the N -th Cartesian power of Y1). In
addition, for an event X = x, its probability is denoted by P (x). In the remainder of this paper,
the base of the log function is 2.
An independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) generated vector xN according to the probability
P (x) is -typical if for all x ∈ X ,
|pixN (x)
N
− P (x)| ≤ ,
where pixN (x) is the number of x showing up in xN . The set composed of all typical vectors xN
is called the strong typical set, and it is denoted by TN (P (x)). The following lemmas related
with TN (P (x)) will be used in the rest of this paper.
Lemma 1: (Covering Lemma [23]): Let XN and Y N(l) (l ∈ L and |L| ≥ 2NR) be i.i.d.
generated random vectors with respect to (w.r.t.) the probabilities P (x) and P (y), respectively.
Here notice that XN is independent of Y N(l). Then there exists ν > 0 satisfying the condition
that
lim
N→∞
P (∀l ∈ L, (XN , Y N(l)) /∈ TNν (P (x, y))) = 0
if R > I(X;Y ) + ϕ(ν), where ϕ(ν)→ 0 as ν → 0.
Lemma 2: (Packing Lemma [23]): Let XN and Y N(l) (l ∈ L and |L| ≤ 2NR) be i.i.d.
generated random vectors w.r.t. the probabilities P (x) and P (y), respectively. Here notice that
XN is independent of Y N(l). Then there exists ν > 0 satisfying the condition that
lim
N→∞
P (∃l ∈ L s.t. (XN , Y N(l)) ∈ TNν (P (x, y))) = 0
if R < I(X;Y )− ϕ(ν), where ϕ(ν)→ 0 as ν → 0.
5Lemma 3: (Balanced coloring lemma [16, p. 260]): For any , δ > 0 and sufficiently large
N , let QN , UN1 , U
N
2 , V
N
2 , Y
N
1 and Y
N
2 be i.i.d. generated random vectors respectively w.r.t. the
probabilities P (q), P (u1), P (u2), P (v2), P (y1) and P (y2). Given yN2 , P (q), P (u1), P (u2) and
P (v2), let TNP (y1|y2,q,u1,u2,v2)(y
N
2 , q
N , uN1 , u
N
2 , v
N
2 ) be the conditional strong typical set composed
of all yN1 satisfying the fact that (y
N
1 , y
N
2 , q
N , uN1 , u
N
2 , v
N
2 ) are jointly typical. In addition, for
γ < |TNP (y1|y2,q,u1,u2,v2)(yN2 , qN , uN1 , uN2 , vN2 )|, let φ be a γ-coloring
φ : TN (P (y1))→ {1, 2, .., γ},
and φ−1(k) (k ∈ {1, 2, .., γ}) be a set composed of all yN1 such that φ(yN1 ) = k and yN1 ∈
TNP (y1|y2,q,u1,u2,v2)(y
N
2 , q
N , uN1 , u
N
2 , v
N
2 ). Then we have
|φ−1(k)| ≤ |T
N
P (y1|y2,q,u1,u2,v2)(y
N
2 , q
N , uN1 , u
N
2 , v
N
2 )|(1 + δ)
γ
, (2.1)
where k ∈ {1, 2, .., γ}.
Remark 1: From Lemma 3, it is easy to see that there are at least
|TNP (y1|y2,q,u1,u2,v2)(yN2 , qN , uN1 , uN2 , vN2 )|
|TN
P (y1|y2,q,u1,u2,v2)(y
N
2 ,q
N ,uN1 ,u
N
2 ,v
N
2 )|(1+δ)
γ
=
γ
1 + δ
(2.2)
colors and at most γ colors mapped by TNP (y1|y2,q,u1,u2,v2)(y
N
2 , q
N , uN1 , u
N
2 , v
N
2 ). Letting γ =
|TNP (y1|y2,q,u1,u2,v2)(yN2 , qN , uN1 , uN2 , vN2 )| and applying the properties of the conditional strong
typical set [23], we see that
γ = |TNP (y1|y2,q,u1,u2,v2)(yN2 , qN , uN1 , uN2 , vN2 )| ≥ (1− 1)2N(1−2)H(Y1|Y2,Q,U1,U2,V2), (2.3)
where 1 and 2 tend to zero while N →∞.
B. Non-feedback coding scheme for the BC-MSR
For the model of Figure 1 without feedback, a hybrid coding scheme combining Marton’s
binning technique for the general broadcast channel [22] with the random binning technique
for the wiretap channel [1] is proposed in [12], [13]. In this subsection, we review this hybrid
coding scheme.
Definitions:
The message Wj (j = 1, 2) is conveyed to Receiver j, and it is uniformly drawn from the set
{1, ..., 2NRj}. The randomly generated W ′j , which is used for confusing the illegal receiver 2, is
2The idea of using random messages to confuse the wiretapper is exactly the same as the random binning technique used in
Wyner’s wiretap channel [1], where this randomly produced message is analogous to the randomly chosen bin index used in
the random binning scheme.
6uniformly drawn from the set {1, ..., 2NR′j}, i.e., Pr{W ′j = i} = 2−NR
′
j , where i ∈ {1, ..., 2NR′j}.
Moreover, similar to the coding scheme in Marton’s achievable region for the broadcast channel
[22], the message W ′′j , which enables its codeword U
N
j to be jointly typical with other codewords,
chooses values from the set {1, ..., 2NR′′j }.
Code construction:
First, randomly generate 2NR0 i.i.d. QN w.r.t. P (q), and label them as qN(w0), where w0 ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2NR0}. Then, for each possible value of qN , randomly generate 2N(Rj+R′j+R′′j ) i.i.d. UNj
w.r.t. P (uj|q), and label them as uNj (wj, w′j, w′′j ), where wj ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NRj}, w′j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
′
j}
and w′′j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
′′
j }. Finally, for each possible value of qN , uN1 and uN2 , the channel input
xN is i.i.d. generated w.r.t. P (x|q, u1, u2).
Encoding procedure:
The transmitter selects qN(w0), uN1 (w1, w
′
1, w
′′
1 ) and u
N
2 (w2, w
′
2, w
′′
2 ) to transmit. Here no-
tice that w0, w
′
1 and w
′
2 are randomly chosen from the sets {1, 2, ..., 2NR0}, {1, 2, ..., 2NR
′
1}
and {1, 2, ..., 2NR′2}, respectively, and the indexes w′′1 and w′′2 are chosen by finding a pair of
(uN1 (w1, w
′
1, w
′′
1 ), u
N
2 (w2, w
′
2, w
′′
2 )) satisfying the condition that given q
N(w0), (uN1 , u
N
2 , q
N(w0))
are jointly typical. If multiple pairs exist, choose the pair with the smallest indexes; if no such
pair exists, proclaim an encoding error. On the basis of the covering lemma (see Lemma 1), this
kind of encoding error tends to zero if
R
′′
1 +R
′′
2 ≥ I(U1;U2|Q). (2.4)
Decoding procedure:
First, Receiver j (j = 1, 2) chooses a unique qN jointly typical with yNj . if more than one or
no such qN exists, declare an decoding error. From packing lemma (see Lemma 2), this kind of
decoding error tends to zero if
R0 ≤ I(Yj;Q). (2.5)
After decoding qN , Receiver j seeks a unique uNj satisfying the condition that (u
N
j , q
N , yNj ) are
jointly typical. From the packing lemma, this kind of decoding error tends to zero if
Rj +R
′
j +R
′′
j ≤ I(Yj;Uj|Q). (2.6)
Once uNj is decoded, Receiver j extracts wj in it.
Equivocation analysis:
7The Receiver 2’s equivocation rate ∆1, which is denoted by ∆1 = 1NH(W1|Y N2 ), follows that
∆1 =
1
N
H(W1|Y N2 ) ≥
1
N
H(W1|Y N2 , QN , UN2 )
=
1
N
(H(W1, Y
N
2 , Q
N , UN2 )−H(Y N2 , QN , UN2 ))
=
1
N
(H(UN1 ,W1, Y
N
2 , Q
N , UN2 )−H(UN1 |W1, Y N2 , QN , UN2 )−H(Y N2 , QN , UN2 ))
(a)
=
1
N
(H(Y N2 |QN , UN2 , UN1 ) +H(UN1 |QN , UN2 )−H(UN1 |W1, Y N2 , QN , UN2 )−H(Y N2 |QN , UN2 ))
=
1
N
(H(UN1 |QN)− I(UN1 ;UN2 |QN)−H(UN1 |W1, Y N2 , QN , UN2 )− I(Y N2 ;UN1 |QN , UN2 ))
(b)
=
1
N
(N(R1 +R
′
1 +R
′′
1)−NI(U1;U2|Q)−NI(Y2;U1|Q,U2)−H(UN1 |W1, Y N2 , QN , UN2 ))
(c)
≥ R1 +R′1 +R
′′
1 − I(U1;U2|Q)− I(Y2;U1|Q,U2)− δ(1), (2.7)
where (a) follows from H(W1|UN1 ) = 0, (b) follows from the generation of Qn, Un1 , Un2 and the
channel is memoryless, and (c) follows from that given w˜1, qN , uN2 and y
n
2 , Receiver 2 tries to
find out only one un1 that is jointly typical with y
n
2 , q
n, un2 , and implied by the packing lemma,
we see that Receiver 2’s decoding error tends to zero if
R1 +R
′
1 ≤ I(Y2;U1|Q,U2), (2.8)
then applying Fano’s lemma, 1
N
H(UN1 |W1, Y N2 , QN , UN2 ) ≤ 1 is obtained, where 1 → 0 while
N →∞. From (2.7), we can conclude that ∆1 ≥ R1 −  if
R
′
1 +R
′′
1 ≥ I(U1;U2|Q) + I(Y2;U1|Q,U2). (2.9)
Analogously, we can conclude that ∆2 ≥ R2 −  if
R
′
2 +R
′′
2 ≥ I(U1;U2|Q) + I(Y1;U2|Q,U1), (2.10)
and
R2 +R
′
2 ≤ I(Y1;U2|Q,U1). (2.11)
From (2.4), (2.6), (2.8), (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11), the achievable secrecy rate region Cbc−msr for
the BC-MSR [12] is obtained, and it is given by
Cbc−msr = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(Y1;U1|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q)− I(Y2;U1|Q,U2)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(Y2;U2|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q)− I(Y1;U2|Q,U1)}.
8Combining the above coding scheme for Cbc−msr with the already existing secret key based
feedback scheme for the WTC [16], it is not difficult to propose a secret key based feedback
coding scheme for the BC-MSR, which will be shown in the next section.
C. The Generalized Wyner-Ziv Coding Scheme for the Distributed Source Coding with Side
Information
Fig. 2: The distributed source coding with side information
In this subsection, we review the generalized Wyner-Ziv coding scheme for the distributed
source coding with side information [24]. For the distributed source coding with side information
shown in Figure 2, the source XN is correlated with the side information Y N1 and Y
N
2 , and
they are i.i.d. generated according to the probability P (x, y1, y2). Using an encoding function
φ : XN → {1, 2, ..., 2NR0} × {1, 2, ..., 2NR1} × {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}, the transmitter compresses XN
into three indexes W ∗0 , W
∗
1 and W
∗
2 respectively choosing values from the sets {1, 2, ..., 2NR0},
{1, 2, ..., 2NR1} and {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}. The indexes W ∗0 , W ∗j (j = 1, 2) together with the side
information Y Nj are available at Receiver j. Receiver j generates a reconstruction sequence Vˆ
N
j =
ϕ(W ∗0 ,W
∗
j , Y
N
j ) by applying a reconstruction function ϕj : {1, 2, ..., 2NR0} × {1, 2, ..., 2NRj} ×
YNj → VNj to the indexes W ∗0 , W ∗j and the side information Y Nj . The goal of the communication
is that the reconstruction sequence Vˆ Nj is jointly typical with the source X
N according to the
probability P (vj|x)× P (x).
A rate triplet (R0, R1, R2) is said to be achievable if for any  > 0, there exists a sequence
of encoding and reconstruction functions (φ, ϕ1, ϕ2) such that
Pr{(XN , Vˆ Nj ) /∈ TN (P (x, vj))} → 0 (2.12)
9as N →∞. The following generalized Wyner-Ziv Theorem [24] provides an achievable region
Rinner consisting of achievable rate triplets (R0, R1, R2) for this distributed source coding with
side information problem.
Theorem 1: (Generalized Wyner-Ziv Theorem): For the distributed source coding with side
information, an achievable rate region Rinner is given by
Rinner = {(R0, R1, R2) : R0 +R1 ≥ I(X;V0, V1|Y1)
R0 +R2 ≥ I(X;V0, V2|Y2)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≥ I(X;V1|Y1, V0) + I(X;V2|Y2, V0) + max
j∈{1,2}
I(X;V0|Yj)}, (2.13)
where (V0, V1, V2)→ X → (Y1, Y2).
Achievable coding scheme for Theorem 1:
• Definitions: The index w∗0 chooses values from the set {1, 2, ..., 2NR0}, and divide w∗0 into
three sub-indexes w∗0,0, w
∗
0,1 and w
∗
0,2, where each sub-index w
∗
0,i (i ∈ {0, 1, 2}) chooses
values from the set {1, 2, ..., 2NR0,i} and R0,0 + R0,1 + R0,2 = R0. The index w∗1 chooses
values from {1, 2, ..., 2NR1}, and divide w∗1 into two sub-indexes w∗1,0 and w∗1,1, where each
sub-index w∗1,j (j ∈ {0, 1}) chooses values from {1, 2, ..., 2NR1,j} and R1,0+R1,1 = R1. Sim-
ilarly, the index w∗2 chooses values from {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}, and divide w∗2 into two sub-indexes
w∗2,0 and w
∗
2,2, where each sub-index w
∗
2,l (l ∈ {0, 2}) chooses values from {1, 2, ..., 2NR2,l}
and R2,0 + R2,2 = R2. Define k1,0, k2,0, k1 and k2 as auxiliary indexes respectively taking
values in {1, 2, ..., 2N(R′0−R1,0)}, {1, 2, ..., 2N(R′0−R2,0)}, {1, 2, ..., 2NR′1} and {1, 2, ..., 2NR′2}.
• Code-book generation: There are two different ways to generate the sequence vN0 . The
first way is to generate 2N(R0,0+R
′
0) i.i.d. sequences vN0 (1;w
∗
0,0, w
∗
1,0, k1,0) with respect to
(w.r.t.) the probability P (v0). The second way is to generate 2N(R0,0+R
′
0) i.i.d. sequences
vN0 (2;w
∗
0,0, w
∗
2,0, k2,0) w.r.t. the probability P (v0). Here note that v
N
0 (j;w
∗
0,0, w
∗
j,0, kj,0) (j ∈
{1, 2}) is intended to be decoded by Receiver j. Then, generate 2N(R0,1+R1,1+R′1) i.i.d.
sequences vN1 (w
∗
0,1, w
∗
1,1, k1) w.r.t. the probability P (v1), and generate 2
N(R0,2+R2,2+R
′
2) i.i.d.
sequences vN2 (w
∗
0,2, w
∗
2,2, k2) w.r.t. the probability P (v2).
• Encoding: Given a source xN , the encoder seeks a pair of sequences (vN0 (j; w˜∗0,0, w˜∗j,0, k˜j,0),
vNj (w˜
∗
0,j, w˜
∗
j,j, k˜j)) (j ∈ {1, 2}) satisfying the condition that (xN , vN0 (j; w˜∗0,0, w˜∗j,0, k˜j,0), vNj (w˜∗0,j, w˜∗j,j, k˜j))
are jointly typical. If there is more than one such pair, randomly choose one. If there is
10
no such pair, declare an encoding error. On the basis of the covering lemma (see 1), the
encoding error tends to zero if
R
′
0 +R0,0 ≥ I(X;V0), (2.14)
and
R
′
j +R0,j +Rj,j ≥ I(Vj;X, V0). (2.15)
Once the sequences vN0 (j; w˜
∗
0,0, w˜
∗
j,0, k˜j,0) and v
N
j (w˜
∗
0,j, w˜
∗
j,j, k˜j) are chosen for j ∈ {1, 2},
the encoder sends the index w∗0 = (w˜
∗
0,0, w˜
∗
0,1, w˜
∗
0,2) to both receivers, sends w
∗
1 = (w˜
∗
1,0, w˜
∗
1,1)
to Receiver 1 only, and sends w∗2 = (w˜
∗
2,0, w˜
∗
2,2) to Receiver 2 only.
• Decoding: Upon receiving the indexes w∗0 and w∗j (j ∈ {1, 2}), Receiver j parses the
common index w∗0 as (w˜
∗
0,0, w˜
∗
0,1, w˜
∗
0,2), and its private index w
∗
j as (w˜
∗
j,0, w˜
∗
j,j). Then given
the side information yNj and w˜
∗
0,0, w˜
∗
0,1, w˜
∗
0,2, w˜
∗
j,0, w˜
∗
j,j , Receiver j seeks a unique pair of
(vN0 (j; w˜
∗
0,0, w˜
∗
j,0, kˆj,0), v
N
j (w˜
∗
0,j, w˜
∗
j,j, kˆj)) satisfying the condition that (v
N
0 (j; w˜
∗
0,0, w˜
∗
j,0, kˆj,0),
vNj (w˜
∗
0,j, w˜
∗
j,j, kˆj), y
N
j ) are jointly typical. If there is no or more than one pair, declare an
decoding error. On the basis of the packing lemma (see 2), Receiver j’s decoding error
tends to zero if
R
′
j ≤ I(Vj;V0, Yj), (2.16)
and
R
′
0 −Rj,0 +R
′
j ≤ I(V0;Yj) + I(Vj;V0, Yj). (2.17)
Once Receiver j finds such unique pair of (vN0 (j; w˜
∗
0,0, w˜
∗
j,0, kˆj,0), v
N
j (w˜
∗
0,j, w˜
∗
j,j, kˆj)), he
generates the re-construction sequence Vˆ Nj = v
N
j (w˜
∗
0,j, w˜
∗
j,j, kˆj).
• Using the fact that R0,0 + R0,1 + R0,2 = R0, R1,0 + R1,1 = R1, R2,0 + R2,2 = R2, and
applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination to remove R′0, R
′
1 and R
′
2 from (2.14), (2.15), (2.16)
and (2.17), Theorem 1 is proved.
Here note that the generalized Wyner-Ziv coding scheme described above indicates that in a
broadcast channel, each receiver’s channel output can be viewed as side information helping the
receiver to decode an estimation of the channel input, and this estimation of the channel input
helps the receiver to improve his decoding performance. Motivated by this generalized Wyner-
Ziv coding scheme, in the next section, a hybrid feedback strategy for the BC-MSR is proposed,
which combines the already existing secret key based feedback scheme for the WTC [16] and
11
the generalized Wyner-Ziv coding scheme with the previous non-feedback coding scheme for
the BC-MSR described in Subsection II-B.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULTS
The model of BC-MSR consists of one input xN , two outputs yN1 , y
N
2 , and satisfies
P (yN1 , y
N
2 |xN) =
n∏
i=1
P (y1,i, y2,i|xi), (3.1)
where xi ∈ X , y1,i ∈ Y1 and y2,i ∈ Y2.
Let W1 and W2 be the transmission messages, and their values respectively belong to the
alphabets W1 = {1, 2, ...,M1} and W2 = {1, 2, ...,M2}. In addition, Pr{W1 = i} = 1M1 for
i ∈ W1, and Pr{W2 = j} = 1M2 for j ∈ W2. Using feedback, the transmitter produces the
time-t channel input Xt as a function of the messages W1, W2 and of the previously received
channel outputs Y1,1,...,Y1,t−1 and Y2,1,...,Y2,t−1, i.e.,
Xt = ft(W1,W2, Y
t−1
1 , Y
t−1
2 ) (3.2)
for some stochastic encoding function ft (1 ≤ t ≤ N ).
After N channel uses, Receiver j (j = 1, 2) decodes Wj . Namely, Receiver j generates the
guess
Wˆj = ψj(Y
N
j ),
where ψj is Receiver j’s decoding function. Receiver j’s average decoding error probability is
denoted by
Pe,j =
1
Mj
∑
wj∈Wj
Pr{ψj(yNj ) 6= wj|wj sent}. (3.3)
Receiver 2’s equivocation rate of the message W1 is formulated as
∆1 =
1
N
H(W1|Y N2 ). (3.4)
Analogously, Receiver 1’s equivocation rate oft the message W2 is formulated as
∆2 =
1
N
H(W2|Y N1 ). (3.5)
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Define an achievable secrecy rate pair (R1, R2) as below. Given two positive numbers R1 and
R2, if for arbitrarily small , there exist one channel encoder and two channel decoders with
parameters M1, M2, N , ∆1, ∆2, Pe,1 and Pe,2 satisfying
logM1
N
≥ R1 − , (3.6)
logM2
N
≥ R2 − , (3.7)
∆1 ≥ R1 − , (3.8)
∆2 ≥ R2 − , (3.9)
Pe,1 ≤ , Pe,2 ≤ , (3.10)
the pair (R1, R2) is called an achievable secrecy rate pair. The secrecy capacity region Cfs consists
of all achievable secrecy rate pairs. We first propose a hybrid inner bound Cf−in−2s on Cfs . The
feedback channel outputs Y i−11 and Y
i−1
2 are not only used to generate secret keys protecting
part of the messages, but also used to produce cooperative messages represented by V0, V1 and
V2 helping the receivers to improve their decoding performances. The inner bound Cf−in−2s is
provided in the following Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Cf−in−2s ⊆ Cfs , where
Cf−in−2s = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ min{[I(U1;Y1, V1|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q)− I(U1;Y2, V2|Q,U2)]+
+H(Y1|Q,U1, U2, Y2, V2), I(U1;Y1, V1|Q)},
0 ≤ R2 ≤ min{[I(U2;Y2, V2|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q)− I(U2;Y1, V1|Q,U1)]+ +H(Y2|Q,U1, U2, Y1, V1),
I(U2;Y2, V2|Q)},
0 ≤ R1 ≤ min{I(Q;Y1, V1), I(Q;Y2, V2)}+ I(U1;Y1, V1|Q)− I(V0, V1;Q,U1, U2, Y˜ |Y1),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ min{I(Q;Y1, V1), I(Q;Y2, V2)}+ I(U2;Y2, V2|Q)− I(V0, V2;Q,U1, U2, Y˜ |Y2),
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(Q;Y1, V1), I(Q;Y2, V2)}+ I(U1;Y1, V1|Q) + I(U2;Y2, V2|Q)
−I(U1;U2|Q)− I(V1;Q,U1, U2, Y˜ |Y1, V0)− I(V2;Q,U1, U2, Y˜ |Y2, V0)−
max{I(V0;Q,U1, U2, Y˜ |Y1), I(V0;Q,U1, U2, Y˜ |Y2)}},
Y˜ = (Y1, Y2) and the joint distribution is denoted by
P (q, u1, u2, v0, v1, v2, x, y1, y2)
= P (v0, v1, v2|q, u1, u2, y1, y2)P (y1, y2|x)P (x|u1, u2)P (u1, u2|q)P (q). (3.11)
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Proof: The coding scheme achieving the inner bound Cf−in−2s combines the already existing
secret key based feedback scheme for the WTC [16] and the previous non-feedback coding
scheme for the BC-MSR with the generalized Wyner-Ziv scheme described in Section II, and it
can be briefly illustrated as follows.
• Encoding: The transmission is through n blocks. First, similar to the secret key based
feedback scheme for the WTC [16], in each block, split the transmitted message wi (i ∈
{1, 2}) into two parts, i.e., wi = (wi,1, wi,2). The sub-message wi,1 is encoded exactly the
same as that in the non-feedback coding scheme for BC-MSR (see Section II), and wi,2 is
encrypted by a key produced by the feedback channel output yNi of the previous block. Then,
compress the encoded sequences uN1 , u
N
2 , q
N and the feedback channel outputs yN1 and y
N
2
from the previous block into three indexes w∗0, w
∗
1 and w
∗
2. Similar to the generalized Wyner-
Ziv coding scheme introduced in Section II, we use the indexes w∗0, w
∗
1 and w
∗
2 to generate
vN1 , v
N
2 and v
N
0 , where v
N
i (i ∈ {1, 2}) is Receiver i’s estimation of the channel input, and
vN0 is an auxiliary sequence helping Receiver i to decode v
N
i . Finally, the sequence u
N
i
(i ∈ {1, 2}) for each block is chosen according to the current block’s wi,1, similar auxiliary
messages w′i, w
′′
i shown in the non-feedback coding scheme for BC-MSR (see Section II),
the encrypted wi,2 and the previous block’s compressed index w∗i . Moreover, the sequence
qN is chosen according to the current block’s randomly chosen “common message” w0
(see the non-feedback coding scheme for BC-MSR in Section II) and the previous block’s
compressed index w∗0. Here note that for the last block, we do not transmit the real message
wi (i ∈ {1, 2}) to Receiver i, i.e., we transmit a constant in block n.
• Decoding: The decoding for Receiver i (i ∈ {1, 2}) begins from the last block. In block n,
using a similar decoding scheme of the non-feedback coding scheme for BC-MSR, Receiver
i decodes uNi and q
N for block n. Then he extracts the block n− 1’s compressed indexes
w∗i and w
∗
0 from the decoded u
N
i and q
N of block n, respectively. Next, similar to the
generalized Wyner-Ziv coding scheme, Receiver i views the received signal yNi of block
n− 1 as side information. Given block n− 1’s w∗i , w∗0 and yNi , Receiver i seeks a unique
pair of (vNi , v
N
0 ) in block n−1 satisfying the condition that (vNi , vN0 , yNi ) are jointly typical.
Once vNi of block n − 1 is decoded, Receiver i decodes qN for block n − 1 by finding a
unique qN satisfying the condition that (qN , yNi , v
N
i ) are jointly typical. After q
N for block
n− 1 is decoded, Receiver i decodes uNi for block n− 1 by finding a unique uNi satisfying
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the condition that (uNi , q
N , yNi , v
N
i ) are jointly typical. Once Receiver i decodes u
N
i and q
N
for block n − 1, he obtains the transmitted message wi for block n − 1 and extracts the
block n − 2’s compressed indexes w∗i and w∗0. Repeating the above decoding procedure,
Receiver i obtains all the messages.
Details about the proof are in Section IV.
Then, we propose a secret key based inner bound Cf−in−1s on Cfs , where the feedback is used to
produce keys, and these keys together with the random binning technique prevent each receiver’s
intended message from being eavesdropped by the other receiver. The inner bound Cf−in−1s is
shown in the following Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: Cf−in−1s ⊆ Cfs , where
Cf−in−1s = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ [I(U1;Y1|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q)− I(U1;Y2|Q,U2)]+ +H(Y1|Q,U1, U2, Y2),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ [I(U2;Y2|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q)− I(U2;Y1|Q,U1)]+ +H(Y2|Q,U1, U2, Y1),
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|Q), 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|Q),
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(Q;Y1), I(Q;Y2)}+ I(U1;Y1|Q) + I(U2;Y2|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q)},
and the joint distribution is denoted by
P (q, u1, u2, x, y1, y2) = P (y1, y2|x)P (x|u1, u2)P (u1, u2|q)P (q), (3.12)
which indicates the Markov condition Q→ (U1, U2)→ X → (Y1, Y2).
Proof: The coding scheme achieving the inner bound Cf−in−1s combines the already existing
secret key based feedback scheme for the WTC [16] with the previous non-feedback coding
scheme for the BC-MSR (see Section II). Letting V0, V1 and V2 (the estimation of the channel
input) of Cf−in−2s be constants, Cf−in−1s is directly obtained. Since the proof of Cf−in−1s is along
the lines of the proof of Cf−in−2s without V0, V1 and V2, we omit the achievability proof of the
inner bound Cf−in−1s here.
Finally, we propose an outer bound Cf−outs on Cfs , see the following Theorem 4.
Theorem 4: Cfs ⊆ Cf−outs , where
Cf−outs = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ min{I(U1;Y1|Q)− I(U1;Y2|Q), I(U1;Y1|Q,U2)− I(U1;Y2|Q,U2),
H(Y1|Q,U2, Y2)},
0 ≤ R2 ≤ min{I(U2;Y2|Q)− I(U2;Y1|Q), I(U2;Y2|Q,U1)− I(U2;Y1|Q,U1), H(Y2|Q,U1, Y1)}},
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the joint distribution is denoted by
P (q, u1, u2, x, y1, y2) = P (y1, y2|x)P (x|q, u1, u2)P (q, u1, u2), (3.13)
and Q may be assumed to be a (deterministic) function of U1 and U2.
Proof: See Appendix A.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The messages are conveyed to the receivers via n blocks. In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the random
sequences XN , Y N1 , Y
N
2 , Q
N , UN1 , U
N
2 , V
N
0 , V
N
1 and V
N
2 are denoted by X¯i, Y¯1,i, Y¯2,i, Q¯i, U¯1,i,
U¯2,i, V¯0,i, V¯1,i and V¯2,i, respectively. In addition, let Xn = (X¯1, ..., X¯n) be a collection of the
random sequences XN for all blocks. Similarly, define Y n1 = (Y¯1,1, ..., Y¯1,n), Y
n
2 = (Y¯2,1, ..., Y¯2,n),
Qn = (Q¯1, ..., Q¯n), Un1 = (U¯1,1, ..., U¯1,n), U
n
2 = (U¯2,1, ..., U¯2,n), V
n
0 = (V¯0,1, ..., V¯0,n), V
n
1 =
(V¯1,1, ..., V¯1,n) and V n2 = (V¯2,1, ..., V¯2,n). The value of the random vector is written in lower case
letter.
Code-books generation:
• The message Wj (j = 1, 2) is sent to Receiver j via n blocks, i.e., the message Wj is com-
posed of n components (Wj = (Wj,1, ...,Wj,n)), and each component Wj,i (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n})
is the message transmitted in block i. Here Wj,i takes values in the set {1, ..., 2NRj}.
Further divide Wj,i into two parts, i.e., Wj,i = (Wj,1,i,Wj,2,i). The values of Wj,1,i and
Wj,2,i respectively belong to the sets {1, ..., 2NRj1} and {1, ..., 2NRj2}. Here notice that
Rj1 +Rj2 = Rj .
• In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), randomly generate 2N(R0+R˜0) i.i.d. Q¯i w.r.t. P (q), and index
them as q¯i(w0,i, w∗0,0,i, w
∗
0,1,i, w
∗
0,2,i), where w0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR0}, w∗0,0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜00},
w∗0,1,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜01}, w∗0,2,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜02}, and R˜00 + R˜01 + R˜02 = R˜0.
• For each possible value of q¯i, randomly generate 2N(R1+R
′
1+R
′′
1+R˜1) i.i.d. U¯1,i w.r.t. P (u1|q),
and index them as u¯1,i(w1,1,i, w1,2,i, w
′
1,i, w
′′
1,i, w
∗
1,0,i, w
∗
1,1,i), where w1,1,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR11},
w1,2,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR12}, w′1,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
′
1}, w′′1,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
′′
1 }, w∗1,0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜10},
w∗1,1,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜11}, R11 +R12 = R1 and R˜10 + R˜11 = R˜1.
• Analogously, for each possible value of q¯i, randomly generate 2N(R2+R
′
2+R
′′
2+R˜2) i.i.d. U¯2,i
w.r.t. P (u2|q), and index them as u¯2,i(w2,1,i, w2,2,i, w′2,i, w′′2,i, w∗2,0,i, w∗2,2,i), where w2,1,i ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2NR21}, w2,2,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR22}, w′2,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
′
2}, w′′2,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR
′′
2 },
w∗2,0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜20}, w∗2,2,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜22}, R21 +R22 = R1 and R˜20 + R˜22 = R˜2.
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• In block i, for each possible values of q¯i, u¯1,i and u¯2,i, the channel input X˜i is i.i.d. generated
w.r.t. P (x|q, u1, u2).
• For each possible value of q¯i, u¯1,i, u¯2,i, y¯1,i and y¯2,i, produce V¯0,i in two ways:
– 1) Produce 2N(R˜00+R˜
′
0) i.i.d. V¯0,i w.r.t. P (v0|q, u1, u2, y1, y2), and index them as v¯0,i(1;w∗0,0,i, w∗1,0,i, t1,0,i),
where w∗0,0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜00}, w∗1,0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜10} and t1,0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(R˜
′
0−R˜10)}.
– Produce 2N(R˜00+R˜
′
0) i.i.d. V¯0,i w.r.t. P (v0|q, u1, u2, y1, y2), and label them as v¯0,i(2;w∗0,0,i, w∗2,0,i, t2,0,i),
where w∗0,0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜00}, w∗2,0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜20} and t2,0,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(R˜
′
0−R˜20)}.
• For each possible value of q¯i, u¯1,i, u¯2,i, y¯1,i and y¯2,i, produce 2N(R˜01+R˜11+R˜
′
1) i.i.d. V¯1,i w.r.t.
P (v1|q, u1, u2, y1, y2) =
∑
v0,v2
P (v0, v1, v2|q, u1, u2, y1, y2), and label them as v¯1,i(w∗0,1,i, w∗1,1,i, t1,i),
where w∗0,1,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜01}, w∗1,1,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜11} and t1,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜
′
1}.
• Analogously, for each possible value of q¯i, u¯1,i, u¯2,i y¯1,i and y¯2,i, produce 2N(R˜02+R˜22+R˜
′
2)
i.i.d. V¯2,i w.r.t. P (v2|q, u1, u2, y1, y2) =
∑
v0,v1
P (v0, v1, v2|q, u1, u2, y1, y2), and label them
as v¯2,i(w∗0,2,i, w
∗
2,2,i, t2,i), where w
∗
0,2,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜02}, w∗2,2,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR˜22} and t2,i ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2NR˜′2}.
Encoding procedure:
• At block 1, the transmitter chooses q¯1(w0,1, 1, 1, 1), u¯1,1(w1,1,1, w1,2,1 = 1, w
′
1,1, w
′′
1,1, 1, 1)
and u¯2,1(w2,1,1, w2,2,1 = 1, w
′
2,1, w
′′
2,1, 1, 1) to transmit. Here notice that w
′
1,1 and w
′
2,1 are
randomly chosen from the sets {1, 2, ..., 2NR′1} and {1, 2, ..., 2NR′2}, respectively, and the
indexes w′′1,1 and w
′′
2,1 are chosen by finding a pair of (u¯1,1, u¯2,1) satisfying the condition
that given q¯1, (u¯1,1, u¯2,1, q¯1) are jointly typical. If multiple pairs exist, choose the pair with
the smallest indexes; if no such pair exists, proclaim an encoding error. On the basis of the
covering lemma, this kind of encoding error tends to zero if
R
′′
1 +R
′′
2 ≥ I(U1;U2|Q). (4.1)
• At block i (i ∈ {2, 3, ..., n − 1}), before selecting u¯1,i and u¯2,i, generate two mappings
g1,i : y¯1,i−1 → {1, 2, ..., 2NR12} and g2,i : y¯2,i−1 → {1, 2, ..., 2NR22} 3. On the basis of these
two mappings, generate two RVs K1,i = g1,i(Y¯1,i−1) and K2,i = g2,i(Y¯2,i−1) respectively
taking values in {1, 2, ..., 2NR12} and {1, 2, ..., 2NR22}. Here Pr{K1,i = j} = 2−NR12 for
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR12}, and Pr{K2,i = l} = 2−NR22 for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR22}. The RVs K1,i
and K2,i are used as secret keys encrypting the messages w1,2,i and w2,2,i, respectively, and
3Here note that these mappings are generated exactly the same as that in [16]
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they are independent of the transmitted messages w1,2,i and w2,2,i. The mappings g1,i and
g2,i are revealed to all parties. Once the transmitter gets y¯1,i−1 and y¯2,i−1, he seeks a pair
of (v¯0,i−1, v¯1,i−1) satisfying the condition that (v¯0,i−1(1; w˜∗0,0,i−1, w˜
∗
1,0,i−1, t˜1,0,i−1),
v¯1,i−1(w˜∗0,1,i−1, w˜
∗
1,1,i−1, t˜1,i−1), u¯1,i−1, u¯2,i−1, q¯i−1, y¯1,i−1, y¯2,i−1) are jointly typical. For the
case that more than one pair (v¯0,i−1, v¯1,i−1) exist, pick one pair at random; if there is
no such pair (v¯0,i−1, v¯1,i−1), declare an encoding error. From the covering lemma, this kind
of encoding error tends to zero if
R˜00 + R˜
′
0 ≥ I(V0;Q,U1, U2, Y1, Y2), (4.2)
R˜01 + R˜11 + R˜
′
1 ≥ I(V1;V0, Q, U1, U2, Y1, Y2) (4.3)
hold. Here note that (4.2) guarantees that there exists at least one v¯0,i−1 such that
(v¯0,i−1, u¯1,i−1, u¯2,i−1, q¯i−1, y¯1,i−1, y¯2,i−1) are jointly typical, and (4.3) guarantees that given
v¯0,i−1, there exists at least one v¯1,i−1 satisfying the condition that (v¯1,i−1, v¯0,i−1, u¯1,i−1, u¯2,i−1,
q¯i−1, y¯1,i−1, y¯2,i−1) are jointly typical. Similarly, the transmitter seeks a pair of (v¯0,i−1, v¯2,i−1)
satisfying the condition that (v¯0,i−1(2; w˜∗0,0,i−1, w˜
∗
2,0,i−1, t˜2,0,i−1), v¯2,i−1(w˜
∗
0,2,i−1, w˜
∗
2,2,i−1, t˜2,i−1),
u¯1,i−1, u¯2,i−1, q¯i−1, y¯1,i−1, y¯2,i−1) are jointly typical. For the case that more than one pair
(v¯0,i−1, v¯2,i−1) exist, pick one pair at random; if there is no such pair (v¯0,i−1, v¯2,i−1), declare
an encoding error. From the covering lemma, this kind of encoding error tends to zero if
(4.2) and
R˜02 + R˜22 + R˜
′
2 ≥ I(V2;V0, Q, U1, U2, Y1, Y2) (4.4)
hold. Once the transmitter selects the pairs (v¯0,i−1, v¯1,i−1) and (v¯0,i−1, v¯2,i−1), he chooses
q¯i(w0,i, w˜
∗
0,0,i−1, w˜
∗
0,1,i−1, w˜
∗
0,2,i−1), u¯1,i(w1,1,i, w1,2,i⊕k1,i, w′1,i, w′′1,i, w˜∗1,0,i−1, w˜∗1,1,i−1) and u¯2,i(w2,1,i, w2,2,i⊕
k2,i, w
′
2,i, w
′′
2,i, w˜
∗
2,0,i−1, w˜
∗
2,2,i−1) to transmit. Here note that w
′
1,i, w
′′
1,i, w
′
2,i and w
′′
2,i are
selected the same as those in block 1.
• At block n, once the transmitter receives the feedback y¯1,n−1 and y¯2,n−1, he seeks a pair of
(v¯0,n−1, v¯1,n−1) satisfying the condition that (v¯0,n−1(1; w˜∗0,0,n−1, w˜
∗
1,0,n−1, t˜1,0,n−1),
v¯1,n−1(w˜∗0,1,n−1, w˜
∗
1,1,n−1, t˜1,n−1), u¯1,n−1, u¯2,n−1, q¯n−1, y¯1,n−1, y¯2,n−1) are jointly typical, and
the corresponding encoding error tends to zero when (4.2) and (4.3) hold. Similarly, the
transmitter seeks a pair of (v¯0,n−1, v¯2,n−1) satisfying the condition that (v¯0,n−1(2; w˜∗0,0,n−1,
w˜∗2,0,n−1, t˜2,0,n−1), v¯2,n−1(w˜
∗
0,2,n−1, w˜
∗
2,2,n−1, t˜2,n−1), u¯1,n−1, u¯2,n−1, q¯n−1, y¯1,n−1, y¯2,n−1) are jointly
typical, and the corresponding encoding error tends to zero when (4.2) and (4.4) hold. Then
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the transmitter chooses q¯n(1, w˜∗0,0,n−1, w˜
∗
0,1,n−1, w˜
∗
0,2,n−1), u¯1,n(1, 1, 1, 1, w˜
∗
1,0,n−1, w˜
∗
1,1,n−1) and
u¯2,n(1, 1, 1, 1, w˜
∗
2,0,n−1, w˜
∗
2,2,n−1) to transmit.
Decoding procedure:
Receiver j’s (j = 1, 2) decoding procedure begins from block n. At block n, Receiver j seeks
a unique q¯n jointly typical with y¯j,n. If there is more than one or no such q¯n, declare an decoding
error. From the packing lemma, this kind of decoding error tends to zero if
R˜00 + R˜01 + R˜02 = R˜0 ≤ I(Yj;Q). (4.5)
After decoding q¯n, Receiver j seeks a unique u¯j,n satisfying the condition that (u¯j,n, q¯n, y¯j,n) are
jointly typical. From the packing lemma, this kind of decoding error tends to zero if
R˜j0 + R˜j1 = R˜j ≤ I(Yj;Uj|Q). (4.6)
Once q¯n and u¯j,n are decoded, Receiver j extracts w∗0,0,n−1, w
∗
0,1,n−1, w
∗
0,2,n−1, w
∗
j,0,n−1 and
w∗j,j,n−1 in them. Then on the basis of the extracted messages, Receiver j seeks a unique pair of
(v¯0,n−1, v¯j,n−1) satisfying the condition that (v¯0,n−1(j;w∗0,0,n−1, w
∗
j,0,n−1, tj,0,n−1), v¯j,n−1(w
∗
0,j,n−1,
w∗j,j,n−1, tj,n−1), y¯j,n−1) are jointly typical. From the packing lemma and the multi-variate packing
lemma [23], this kind of decoding error tends to zero if
R˜
′
j ≤ I(Vj;V0, Yj), (4.7)
R˜
′
j + R˜
′
0 − R˜j0 ≤ I(V0;Yj) + I(Vj;V0, Yj). (4.8)
Here notice that (4.7) guarantees the probability of the error event that there is a unique v¯0,n−1
and more than one tj,n−1 satisfying the condition that (v¯0,n−1, v¯j,n−1, y¯j,n−1) are jointly typical
tends to zero, and (4.8) guarantees the probability of the error event that there exist more than
one tj,0,n−1 and tj,n−1 satisfying the condition that (v¯0,n−1, v¯j,n−1, y¯j,n−1) are jointly typical tends
to zero. Then, for block n − 1, after v¯0,n−1 and v¯j,n−1 are decoded, Receiver j seeks a unique
q¯n−1 satisfying the condition that (q¯n−1, y¯j,n−1, v¯j,n−1) are jointly typical, and from the packing
lemma [23], this kind of decoding error tends to zero if
R0 + R˜0 ≤ I(Q;Vj, Yj). (4.9)
Then Receiver j seeks a unique u¯j,n−1 satisfying the condition that (u¯j,n−1, q¯n−1, y¯j,n−1, v¯j,n−1)
are jointly typical, and this kind of decoding error tends to zero if
Rj1 +Rj2 +R
′
j +R
′′
j + R˜j0 + R˜j,j ≤ I(Uj;Vj, Yj|Q). (4.10)
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When q¯n−1 and u¯j,n−1 are decoded, Receiver j extracts w0,n−1, w∗0,0,n−2 w
∗
0,1,n−2, w
∗
0,2,n−2,
wj,1,n−1, wj,2,n−1 ⊕ kj,n−1, w′j,n−1, w′′j,n−1, w∗j,0,n−2 and w∗j,j,n−2. Since the key kj,n−1 generated
from y¯j,n−2 is also known by Receiver j, the messages wj,1,n−1 and wj,2,n−1 are correctly decoded
by Receiver j. Repeat the above decoding procedure, the messages of all blocks are decoded
by Receiver j. The following Figs.3-5 help us to better understand the proposed encoding and
decoding schemes
Fig. 3: The encoding procedure of the transmitter
Equivocation Analysis for Receiver 2:
Receiver 2’s equivocation ∆1, which is denoted by ∆1 = 1nNH(W1|Y n2 ), follows that
∆1 =
1
nN
H(W1|Y n2 )
(a)
=
1
nN
H(W˜11, W˜12|Y n2 )
=
1
nN
(H(W˜11|Y n2 ) +H(W˜12|Y n2 , W˜11)), (4.11)
where (a) follows from the definitions W˜11 = (W1,1,1, ...,W1,1,n) and W˜12 = (W1,2,1, ...,W1,2,n).
The first term H(W˜11|Y n2 ) of (4.11) follows that
H(W˜11|Y n2 ) ≥ H(W˜11|Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 )
= H(W˜11, Y
n
2 , Q
n, Un2 , V
n
2 )−H(Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 )
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Fig. 4: The decoding procedure of Receiver 1
= H(W˜11, Y
n
2 , Q
n, Un2 , V
n
2 , U
n
1 )−H(Un1 |W˜11, Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 )−H(Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 )
(b)
= H(Y n2 , V
n
2 |Qn, Un2 , Un1 ) +H(Qn, Un2 , Un1 )−H(Un1 |W˜11, Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 )
−H(Y n2 , V n2 |Qn, Un2 )−H(Qn, Un2 )
= H(Y n2 , V
n
2 |Qn, Un2 , Un1 ) +H(Un1 |Qn, Un2 )−H(Un1 |W˜11, Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 )
−H(Y n2 , V n2 |Qn, Un2 )
= H(Un1 |Qn)− I(Un1 ;Un2 |Qn)−H(Un1 |W˜11, Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 )
−I(Un1 ;Y n2 , V n2 |Qn, Un2 )
(c)
= H(Un1 |Qn)− nNI(U1;U2|Q)− nNI(U1;Y2, V2|Q,U2)−H(Un1 |W˜11, Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 )
(d)
= (n− 1)N(R11 +R′1 +R
′′
1 + R˜10 + R˜11) + (n− 2)NR12 − nNI(U1;U2|Q)
−nNI(U1;Y2, V2|Q,U2)−H(Un1 |W˜11, Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 )
(e)
≥ (n− 1)N(R11 +R′1 +R
′′
1 + R˜10 + R˜11) + (n− 2)NR12
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Fig. 5: The decoding procedure of Receiver 2
−nNI(U1;U2|Q)− nNI(U1;Y2, V2|Q,U2)− nN3, (4.12)
where (b) follows from H(W˜11|Un1 ) = 0, (c) follows from the generation of Qn, Un1 , Un2 , V n1 ,
V n2 and the channel is memoryless, and (d) follows from the generation of U
n
1 , and (e) follows
from that given w˜11, yn2 , v
n
2 , q
n and un2 , Receiver 2 seeks a unique u
n
1 that is jointly typical with
his own received signals yn2 , v
n
2 , q
n, un2 , and from the packing lemma, we see that Receiver 2’s
decoding error tends to zero if
R12 +R
′
1 + R˜10 + R˜11 ≤ I(Y2, V2;U1|Q,U2), (4.13)
then applying Fano’s lemma, 1
nN
H(Un1 |W˜11, Y n2 , Qn, Un2 , V n2 ) ≤ 3 is obtained, where 3 → 0
while n,N →∞.
The second term H(W˜12|Y n2 , W˜11) of (4.11) is bounded by
H(W˜12|Y n2 , W˜11)
≥
n−1∑
i=2
H(W1,2,i|Y n2 , W˜11,W1,2,1 = 1, ...,W1,2,i−1,W1,2,i ⊕K1,i)
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(f)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H(W1,2,i|Y¯2,i−1,W1,2,i ⊕K1,i)
≥
n−1∑
i=2
H(W1,2,i|Y¯2,i−1,W1,2,i ⊕K1,i, V¯2,i−1, Q¯i−1, U¯1,i−1, U¯2,i−1)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H(K1,i|Y¯2,i−1,W1,2,i ⊕K1,i, V¯2,i−1, Q¯i−1, U¯1,i−1, U¯2,i−1)
(g)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H(K1,i|Y¯2,i−1, V¯2,i−1, Q¯i−1, U¯1,i−1, U¯2,i−1)
(h)
≥ (n− 2)(log 1− 1
1 + δ
+N(1− 2)H(Y1|Y2, V2, Q, U1, U2)), (4.14)
where (f) follows from the Markov chain W1,2,i → (Y¯2,i−1,W1,2,i⊕K1,i)→ (W˜11,W1,2,1, ...,W1,2,i−1,
Y¯2,1, ..., Y¯2,i−2, Y¯2,i, ..., Y¯2,n), (g) follows from K1,i → (Y¯2,i−1, V¯2,i−1, Q¯i−1, U¯1,i−1, U¯2,i−1)→ W1,2,i⊕
K1,i, and (h) follows from Lemma 3 that given y¯2,i−1, q¯i−1, u¯1,i−1, u¯2,i−1 and v¯2,i−1, there are
at least γ
1+δ
colors (see (2.2)), which indicates that
H(K1,i|Y¯2,i−1, V¯2,i−1, Q¯i−1, U¯1,i−1, U¯2,i−1) ≥ log γ
1 + δ
, (4.15)
then substituting (2.3) into (4.15), we get
H(K1,i|Y¯2,i−1, V¯2,i−1, Q¯i−1, U¯1,i−1, U¯2,i−1)
≥ log 1− 1
1 + δ
+N(1− 2)H(Y1|Y2, V2, Q, U1, U2), (4.16)
where 1, 2 and δ tend to 0 while N goes to infinity.
Substituting (4.14) and (4.12) into (4.11), we get
∆1 ≥ n− 1
n
(R11 +R
′
1 +R
′′
1 + R˜10 + R˜11) +
n− 2
n
R12 − I(U1;U2|Q)
−I(V2, Y2;U1|Q,U2)− 3 + n− 2
nN
log
1− 1
1 + δ
+
n− 2
n
(1− 2)H(Y1|Y2, V2, Q, U1, U2).
(4.17)
The bound (4.17) implies that if
R
′
1 +R
′′
1 + R˜10 + R˜11 ≥ I(U1;U2|Q) + I(V2, Y2;U1|Q,U2)−H(Y1|Y2, V2, Q, U1, U2),
(4.18)
∆1 ≥ R1 −  is obtained by choosing sufficiently large n and N .
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Equivocation Analysis for Receiver 1: The equivocation analysis of Receiver 1’s equivocation
∆2 =
1
nN
H(W2|Y n1 ) is analogous to that of ∆1, hence ∆2 ≥ R2 −  can be proved by letting
R22 +R
′
2 + R˜20 + R˜22 ≤ I(Y1, V1;U2|Q,U1), (4.19)
R
′
2 +R
′′
2 + R˜20 + R˜22
≥ I(U1;U2|Q) + I(V1, Y1;U2|Q,U1)−H(Y2|Y1, V1, Q, U1, U2), (4.20)
and selecting sufficiently large n and N .
Now using the fact that R˜0 = R˜00+R˜01+R˜02, R˜1 = R˜10+R˜11, R˜2 = R˜20+R˜22, and applying
Fourier-Motzkin elimination to remove R˜′0, R˜
′
1 and R˜
′
2 from (4.2)-(4.8), we have
R˜0 + R˜1 ≥ I(V0, V1;Q,U1, U2, Y1, Y2|Y1) (4.21)
R˜0 + R˜2 ≥ I(V0, V2;Q,U1, U2, Y1, Y2|Y2) (4.22)
R˜0 + R˜1 + R˜2 ≥ I(V1;Q,U1, U2, Y1, Y2|Y1, V0) + I(V2;Q,U1, U2, Y1, Y2|Y2, V0)
+ max{I(V0;Q,U1, U2, Y1, Y2|Y1), I(V0;Q,U1, U2, Y1, Y2|Y2)}. (4.23)
Then, further using the fact that R1 = R11 + R12 and R2 = R21 + R22, and applying Fourier-
Motzkin elimination to remove R′1, R
′′
1 , R
′
2, R
′′
2 , R˜0, R˜1 and R˜2 from (4.21), (4.22), (4.23), (4.1),
(4.9), (4.10), (4.13), (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20), Theorem 2 is proved.
V. EXAMPLES
A. Dueck-type Example
In this subsection, we further explain the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity
region of the BC-MSR with noiseless feedback via a Dueck-type example. In this example (see
Figure 6), the channel input and outputs satisfy
X = (X0, X1, X2), Y1 = (Y10, Y11), Y2 = (Y20, Y21),
Y10 = Y20 = X0 ⊕ Z0, Y11 = X1 ⊕ Z1, Y21 = X2 ⊕ Z2, (5.1)
where the channel inputs X0, X1, X2 and the channel noises Z0, Z1, Z2 are binary random
variables (taking values in {0, 1}), and the channel noises are independent of the channel inputs.
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Fig. 6: A Dueck-type example of the BC-MSR with noiseless feedback
First, we show the secret key based inner bound Cf−in−1s on the secrecy capacity region of
this Dueck-type example. Letting
P (X0 = 0) = α1, P (X0 = 1) = 1− α1,
P (X1 = 0) = α2, P (X1 = 1) = 1− α2,
P (X2 = 0) = α3, P (X2 = 1) = 1− α3, (5.2)
and substituting Q = X0, U1 = X1, U2 = X2 and (5.1) into Theorem 3, Cf−in−1s reduces to
Cin−1sf , and it is given by
Cin−1sf = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 1−H(Z1|Z0) +H(Z1|Z0, Z2),
R2 ≤ 1−H(Z2|Z0) +H(Z2|Z0, Z1),
R1 ≤ 2−H(Z0, Z1), R2 ≤ 2−H(Z0, Z2),
R1 +R2 ≤ 3 +H(Z0)−H(Z0, Z1)−H(Z0, Z2)}. (5.3)
Here note that (5.3) is obtained when α1 = α2 = α3 = 12 .
Second, we show the hybrid inner bound Cf−in−2s on the secrecy capacity region of this Dueck-
type example. Substituting (5.2), Q = X0, U1 = X1, U2 = X2, V1 = (X0, X1), V2 = (X0, X2),
25
(5.1), V0 = (Z0, Z1) or V0 = (Z0, Z2) into Theorem 2, Cf−in−2s reduces to Cin−2sf , and it is given
by
Cin−2sf = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 1 +H(Z1|Z0, Z2), R2 ≤ 1 +H(Z2|Z0, Z1,
R1 ≤ 2−H(Z0, Z1), R2 ≤ 2−H(Z0, Z2),
R1 +R2 ≤ 3−H(Z0, Z1, Z2)}. (5.4)
Third, we show a simple cut-set outer bound Coutsf on the secrecy capacity region of this
Dueck-type example. Since only X0 and X1 are transmitted to receiver 1, the transmission rate
R1 of the message W1 is upper bounded by I(X0, X1;Y1). Analogously, the transmission rate
R2 is upper bounded by I(X0, X2;Y2). For all receivers, the sum rate R1 +R2 is upper bounded
by I(X0, X1, X2;Y1, Y2). Now it remains to calculate these upper bounds. Since X0, X1, X2,
Z0, Z1 and Z2 take values in {0, 1}, from (5.1), we have
I(X0, X1;Y1) = H(X0 ⊕ Z0, X1 ⊕ Z1)−H(X0 ⊕ Z0, X1 ⊕ Z1|X0, X1)
= H(X0 ⊕ Z0, X1 ⊕ Z1)−H(Z0, Z1|X0, X1)
(1)
= H(X0 ⊕ Z0, X1 ⊕ Z1)−H(Z0, Z1)
≤ H(X0 ⊕ Z0) +H(X1 ⊕ Z1)−H(Z0, Z1)
≤ 2−H(Z0, Z1), (5.5)
where (1) follows from the fact that the channel noises are independent of the channel inputs.
Analogously, we have
I(X0, X2;Y2) ≤ 2−H(Z0, Z2). (5.6)
For I(X0, X1, X2;Y1, Y2), we have
I(X0, X1, X2;Y1, Y2)
= H(X0 ⊕ Z0, X1 ⊕ Z1, X2 ⊕ Z2)−H(X0 ⊕ Z0, X1 ⊕ Z1, X2 ⊕ Z2|X0, X1, X2)
= H(X0 ⊕ Z0, X1 ⊕ Z1, X2 ⊕ Z2)−H(Z0, Z1, Z2|X0, X1, X2)
(2)
= H(X0 ⊕ Z0, X1 ⊕ Z1, X2 ⊕ Z2)−H(Z0, Z1, Z2)
≤ H(X0 ⊕ Z0) +H(X1 ⊕ Z1) +H(X2 ⊕ Z2)−H(Z0, Z1, Z2)
≤ 3−H(Z0, Z1, Z2), (5.7)
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where (2) also follows from the fact that the channel noises are independent of the channel
inputs. Combining (5.5), (5.6) with (5.7), an outer bound Coutsf on the secrecy capacity region of
this Dueck-type example is given by
Coutsf = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 2−H(Z0, Z1), R2 ≤ 2−H(Z0, Z2),
R1 +R2 ≤ 3−H(Z0, Z1, Z2)}. (5.8)
Finally, in order to show the advantage of feedback, we also give an inner bound Cins on the
secrecy capacity region of the Dueck-type example without the feedback. Here notice that in
[12], an achievable secrecy rate region Cin∗s for the BC-MSR is proposed, and it is given by
Cin∗s = {(R1, R2) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q)− I(U1;Y2|Q,U2),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q)− I(U2;Y1|Q,U1)}. (5.9)
Now substituting Q = X0, U1 = X1, U2 = X2, (5.2) and (5.1) into (5.9), Cin∗s reduces to Cins ,
and it is given by
Cins = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 1−H(Z1|Z0), R2 ≤ 1−H(Z2|Z0)}. (5.10)
Here note that (5.10) is obtained when α1 = α2 = α3 = 12 .
In order to compare the above bounds, we further define the channel noises Z0, Z1 and Z2 in
the following two cases:
• Case 1: The channel noise Z2 only depends on Z1, i.e., there exists a Markov chain Z0 →
Z1 → Z2.
• Case 2: The channel noises Z1 and Z2 only depend on the noise Z0, i.e., there exists a
Markov chain Z1 → Z0 → Z2.
In the remainder of this subsection, we show the numerical results on the above two cases of
this Dueck-type example, see the followings.
1) A special case of Dueck-type example with Z0 → Z1 → Z2: For the case Z0 → Z1 → Z2,
define 
P (Z0 = 0) = 1− p, P (Z0 = 1) = p,
P (Z1 = 0|Z0 = 0) = 1− q, P (Z1 = 1|Z0 = 0) = q,
P (Z1 = 0|Z0 = 1) = q, P (Z1 = 1|Z0 = 1) = 1− q,
P (Z2 = 0|Z1 = 0) = 1− r, P (Z2 = 1|Z1 = 0) = r,
P (Z2 = 0|Z1 = 1) = r, P (Z2 = 1|Z1 = 1) = 1− r

, (5.11)
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where 0 ≤ p, q, r ≤ 1
2
. Substituting (5.16) and Z0 → Z1 → Z2 into (5.3), (5.4), (5.8) and (5.10),
we have
Cin−1sf = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 1− h(r ? q) + h(r), R2 ≤ 1− h(r ? q) + h(r),
R1 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(q), R2 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(r ? q),
R1 +R2 ≤ 3− h(q)− h(p)− h(r ? q)}, (5.12)
Cin−2sf = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 1 + h(q)− h(r ? q) + h(r), R2 ≤ 1 + h(r),
R1 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(q), R2 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(r ? q),
R1 +R2 ≤ 3− h(p)− h(q)− h(r)}, (5.13)
Coutsf = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(q), R2 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(r ? q),
R1 +R2 ≤ 3− h(p)− h(q)− h(r)}, (5.14)
Cins = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 1− h(q), R2 ≤ 1− h(r ? q)}, (5.15)
where a?b = a(1−b)+(1−a)b and h(a) = −a log(a)−(1−a) log(1−a) (0 ≤ a ≤ 1). Figure 7
depicts Cin−1sf , Cin−2sf , Coutsf and Cins for p = q = r = 0.05. Form this figure, we conclude that the
hybrid feedback strategy performs better than the secret key based feedback strategy, and both
of these strategies increase the secrecy rate region of the BC-MSR. Moreover, note that there is
still a gap between the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the BC-MSR
with noiseless feedback.
Figure 8 plots Cin−1sf , Cin−2sf , Coutsf and Cins for p = 0.25, q = 0.2 and r = 0.3. Form Figure
8, we conclude that for this case, the secrecy capacity region of the BC-MSR with noiseless
feedback is determined, and this is because the outer bound Coutsf meets with the hybrid strategy
inner bound Cin−2sf . Also, we see that the hybrid feedback coding strategy performs better than
the secret key based feedback strategy, and both of them increase the secrecy rate region of the
BC-MSR.
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Fig. 7: Comparison of the bounds for the case Z0 → Z1 → Z2 and p = q = r = 0.05
Fig. 8: Comparison of the bounds for the case Z0 → Z1 → Z2 and p = 0.25, q = 0.2, r = 0.3
2) A special case of Dueck-type example with Z1 → Z0 → Z2: For the case Z1 → Z0 → Z2,
define 
P (Z0 = 0) = 1− p, P (Z0 = 1) = p,
P (Z1 = 0|Z0 = 0) = 1− q, P (Z1 = 1|Z0 = 0) = q,
P (Z1 = 0|Z0 = 1) = q, P (Z1 = 1|Z0 = 1) = 1− q,
P (Z2 = 0|Z0 = 0) = 1− r, P (Z2 = 1|Z0 = 0) = r,
P (Z2 = 0|Z0 = 1) = r, P (Z2 = 1|Z0 = 1) = 1− r

, (5.16)
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where 0 ≤ p, q, r ≤ 1
2
. Substituting (5.16) and Z0 → Z1 → Z2 into (5.3), (5.4), (5.8) and (5.10),
we have
Cin−1sf = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 1, R2 ≤ 1,
R1 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(q), R2 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(r),
R1 +R2 ≤ 3− h(q)− h(p)− h(r)}, (5.17)
Cin−2sf = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 1 + h(q), R2 ≤ 1 + h(r),
R1 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(q), R2 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(r),
R1 +R2 ≤ 3− h(p)− h(q)− h(r)}, (5.18)
Coutsf = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(q), R2 ≤ 2− h(p)− h(r),
R1 +R2 ≤ 3− h(p)− h(q)− h(r)}, (5.19)
Cins = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ 1− h(q), R2 ≤ 1− h(r)}. (5.20)
Figure 9 depicts Cin−1sf , Cin−2sf , Coutsf and Cins for p = q = r = 0.05. It is easy to see that for the
case Z1 → Z0 → Z2, the hybrid feedback strategy performs better than the secret key based
feedback strategy, and both of these strategies increase the secrecy rate region of the BC-MSR.
Also notice that there is a gap between the inner and outer bounds.
Fig. 9: Comparison of the bounds for the case Z1 → Z0 → Z2 and p = q = r = 0.05
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Figure 10 plots Cin−1sf , Cin−2sf , Coutsf and Cins for p = 0.25, q = 0.2 and r = 0.3. Form Figure
10, we conclude that for this case, the secrecy capacity region of the BC-MSR with noiseless
feedback is determined, and it equals to the inner bounds Cin−1sf , Cin−2sf , and the outer bound
Coutsf . Also, we see that for this case, the secret key based feedback strategy performs as well as
the hybrid feedback coding strategy, and both of them increase the secrecy rate region of the
BC-MSR.
Fig. 10: Comparison of the bounds for the case Z1 → Z0 → Z2 and p = 0.25, q = 0.2, r = 0.3
B. Blackwell-type Example
In this subsection, we explain the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of
the BC-MSR with noiseless feedback via a Blackwell-type example. In this example (see Figure
11), the channel input X chooses values from {0, 1, 2}, the channel outputs Y1 and Y2 choose
values from {0, 1}, and they satisfy
X = 0, Y1 = Z1, Y2 = Z2,
X = 1, Y1 = 1⊕ Z1, Y2 = Z2,
X = 2, Y1 = 1⊕ Z1, Y2 = 1⊕ Z2,
 , (5.21)
where ⊕ is the modulo addition over {0, 1}, the noises Z1 ∼ Bern(p), Z2 ∼ Bern(p) (0 ≤ p ≤
0.5), and the noises Z1, Z2 are mutually independent and they are independent of the channel
inputs.
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Fig. 11: A Blackwell-type example of the BC-MSR with noiseless feedback
For this Blackwell-type example, the secret key based inner bound Cf−in−1∗s is obtained by
defining P (Q = 0) = P (Q = 1) = 1
2
,
P (U1 = 0, U2 = 0|Q = 0) = α, P (U1 = 0, U2 = 1|Q = 0) = 0,
P (U1 = 1, U2 = 0|Q = 0) = 1− α− β, P (U1 = 1, U2 = 1|Q = 0) = β,
P (U1 = 0, U2 = 0|Q = 1) = β, P (U1 = 0, U2 = 1|Q = 1) = 0,
P (U1 = 1, U2 = 0|Q = 1) = 1− α− β, P (U1 = 1, U2 = 1|Q = 1) = α,
(5.22)
X = U1+U2, and substituting (5.21), Z1 ∼ Bern(p) and Z2 ∼ Bern(p) into Theorem 3. Hence
we have
Cf−in−1∗s = {(R1, R2) :
R1 ≤ 1
2
h(α ? p) +
1
2
h(β ? p)− (1− β) log 1
1− β − (1− α) log
1
1− α + (1− α− β) log
1
1− α− β ,
R2 ≤ 1
2
h(α ? p) +
1
2
h(β ? p)− (1− β) log 1
1− β − (1− α) log
1
1− α + (1− α− β) log
1
1− α− β ,
R1 ≤ 1
2
h(α ? p) +
1
2
h(β ? p)− h(p),
R2 ≤ 1
2
h(α ? p) +
1
2
h(β ? p)− h(p),
R1 +R2 ≤ h(α ? p) + h(β ? p)− (1− β) log 1
1− β − (1− α) log
1
1− α + (1− α− β) log
1
1− α− β },
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(5.23)
where a ? b = a(1− b) + (1− a)b and h(a) = −a log(a)− (1− a) log(1− a) (0 ≤ a ≤ 1).
Then, using the above definitions for Cf−in−1∗s and letting V0 = Z, V1 = U1, V2 = U2, the
hybrid inner bound Cf−in−2∗s is obtained by substituting (5.21), Z1 ∼ Bern(p) and Z2 ∼ Bern(p)
into Theorem 2, and it is given by
Cf−in−2∗s = {(R1, R2) :
R1 ≤ min{1
2
h(α) +
1
2
h(β), h(α, β, 1− α− β)− 1
2
h(α)− 1
2
h(β) + h(p)},
R2 ≤ min{1
2
h(α) +
1
2
h(β), h(α, β, 1− α− β)− 1
2
h(α)− 1
2
h(β) + h(p)},
R1 ≤ h(α + β
2
? p)− 2h(p), R2 ≤ h(α + β
2
? (1− p))− 2h(p)
R1 +R2 ≤ h(α + β
2
? p)− 2h(p)− 1
2
h(α)− 1
2
h(β) + h(α, β, 1− α− β)},
(5.24)
where h(α, β, 1− α− β) = −α log(α)− β log(β)− (1− α− β) log(1− α− β).
Next, we show an outer bound Cf−out∗s on the secrecy capacity region of this Blackwell-type
example, and it is obtained from Theorem 4. Specifically, the bound R1 ≤ min{I(U1;Y1|Q) −
I(U1;Y2|Q), I(U1;Y1|Q,U2) − I(U1;Y2|Q,U2), H(Y1|Q,U2, Y2)} in Theorem 4 can be further
bounded by
I(U1;Y1|Q)− I(U1;Y2|Q)
≤ I(U1;Y1|Q) ≤ H(Y1)−H(Y1|Q,U1)
≤ H(Y1)−H(Y1|Q,U1, X) (1)= H(Y1)−H(Y1|X) = I(X;Y1), (5.25)
I(U1;Y1|Q,U2)− I(U1;Y2|Q,U2)
≤ I(U1;Y1|Q,U2) ≤ H(Y1)−H(Y1|Q,U1, U2)
≤ H(Y1)−H(Y1|Q,U1, U2, X) (2)= H(Y1)−H(Y1|X) = I(X;Y1), (5.26)
H(Y1|Q,U2, Y2) ≤ H(Y1|Y2), (5.27)
where (1) is from (Q,U1)→ X → Y1, and (2) is from (Q,U1, U2)→ X → Y1. Hence we have
R1 ≤ min{I(X;Y1), H(Y1|Y2)}. Analogously, we have R2 ≤ min{I(X;Y2), H(Y2|Y1)}. Now
defining
P (X = 0) = α1, P (X = 1) = α2, P (X = 2) = 1− α1 − α2, (5.28)
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and substituting (5.21), Z1 ∼ Bern(p) and Z2 ∼ Bern(p) into R1 ≤ min{I(X;Y1), H(Y1|Y2)}
and R2 ≤ min{I(X;Y2), H(Y2|Y1)}, the outer bound Cf−out∗s is given by
Cf−out∗s = {(R1, R2) :
R1 ≤ min{h(α1 ? p)− h(p), A− h(α1 + α2) ? p)},
R2 ≤ min{h((α1 + α2) ? p)− h(p), A− h(α1 ? p)}, (5.29)
where
A = −(α1p¯2 + α2pp¯+ α1 + α2p2) log(α1p¯2 + α2pp¯+ α1 + α2p2)
−(α1p¯p+ α2p2 + α1 + α2pp¯) log(α1p¯p+ α2p2 + α1 + α2pp¯)
−(α1p¯p+ α2p¯2 + α1 + α2pp¯) log(α1p¯p+ α2p¯2 + α1 + α2pp¯)
−(α1p2 + α2pp¯+ α1 + α2p¯2) log(α1p2 + α2pp¯+ α1 + α2p¯2), (5.30)
p¯ = 1− p and α1 + α2 = 1− α1 − α2.
Finally, we show the inner bound Cin∗∗s on the secrecy capacity region of this Blackwell-type
example without the feedback, and it is obtained by using the above definitions for Cf−in−1∗s and
substituting (5.21), Z1 ∼ Bern(p) and Z2 ∼ Bern(p) into (5.9). Hence we have
Cin∗∗s = {(R1, R2) :
R1 ≤ 1
2
h(α ? p) +
1
2
h(β ? p)− h(p)− β¯ log 1
β¯
− α¯ log 1
α¯
− α + β logα + β,
R2 ≤ 1
2
h(α ? p) +
1
2
h(β ? p)− h(p)− β¯ log 1
β¯
− α¯ log 1
α¯
− α + β logα + β}, (5.31)
where β¯ = 1− β, α¯ = 1− α and α + β = 1− α− β.
To show which feedback strategy performs better in enhancing the total secrecy rate of the BC-
MSR, in this Blackwell-type example, we depict the secrecy sum rates of the bounds Cf−in−1∗s ,
Cf−in−2∗s , Cf−out∗s and Cin∗∗s with different values of p (here p is w.r.t. the channel noise), see
Figure 12. From Figure 12, we see that both feedback strategies increase the secrecy sum rate of
Cin∗∗s , and the hybrid feedback strategy does not always perform better than the secret key based
feedback strategy in enhancing the secrecy sum rate of this Blackwell-type BC-MSR. Moreover,
as shown in Figure 12, there exists a gap between the secrecy sum rates of the inner and outer
bounds, and eliminating this gap is still a tough work.
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Fig. 12: The maximum secrecy sum rates of the bounds for the Blackwell-type example of the
BC-MSR with noiseless feedback
VI. CONCLUSION
Two feedback coding strategies for the BC-MSR are proposed, and the comparison of the
two strategies is shown via two examples. Specifically, in the Dueck-type example, we show the
achievable secrecy rate region of the secret key based feedback strategy is no larger than that
of the hybrid feedback strategy. For the Blackwell-type example, we show the secrecy sum rate
of the hybrid feedback strategy is not always larger than that of the secret key based feedback
strategy. From these two examples, we see that for the BC-MSR, our new hybrid feedback
strategy may perform better than the already existing secret key based feedback strategy, which
offers a new option for enhancing the physical layer security of the broadcast channel models.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
First, define Y i−11 = (Y1,1, Y1,2, ..., Y1,i−1), Y
N
1,i+1 = (Y1,i+1, Y1,i+2, ..., Y1,N), Y
i−1
2 = (Y2,1, Y2,2, ..., Y2,i−1)
and Y N2,i+1 = (Y2,i+1, Y2,i+2, ..., Y2,N). Further define
Q , (Y L−11 , Y N2,L+1, L), U1 , (Q,W1), U2 , (Q,W2), Y1 , Y1,L, Y2 , Y2,L, (A1)
where the RV L is used for time sharing, and it is randomly drawn from the set {1, 2, ..., N}.
In addition, L is independent of the channel input and outputs.
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Next, using the above definitions, we show that R1 can be upper bounded by
R1 − 
(1)
≤ 1
N
H(W1|Y N2 )
=
1
N
(H(W1|Y N2 ,W2) + I(W1;W2|Y N2 ))
(2)
≤ 1
N
H(W1|Y N2 ,W2) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
(H(W1|W2)− I(W1;Y N2 |W2)) +
δ()
N
(3)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1;Y
N
1 |W2)− I(W1;Y N2 |W2)) +
2δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W2)− I(W1;Y2,i|Y N2,i+1,W2)) +
2δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W2, Y N2,i+1) + I(Y1,i;Y N2,i+1|W2, Y i−11 )− I(Y1,i;Y N2,i+1|W1,W2, Y i−11 )
−I(W1;Y2,i|Y i−11 ,W2, Y N2,i+1)− I(Y2,i;Y i−11 |W2, Y N2,i+1) + I(Y2,i;Y i−11 |W1,W2, Y N2,i+1)) +
2δ()
N
(4)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W2, Y N2,i+1)− I(W1;Y2,i|Y i−11 ,W2, Y N2,i+1)) +
2δ()
N
(5)
= I(W1;Y1,L|Y L−11 ,W2, Y N2,L+1, L)− I(W1;Y2,L|Y L−11 ,W2, Y N2,L+1, L) +
2δ()
N
(6)
= I(U1;Y1|U2, Q)− I(U1;Y2|U2, Q) + 2δ()
N
, (A2)
where (1) follows by (3.8), (2) and (3) follow by Fano’s inequality, Pe,1 ≤  and Pe,2 ≤ , (4)
is from the Csisza´r’s equalities
I(Y1,i;Y
N
2,i+1|W2, Y i−11 ) = I(Y2,i;Y i−11 |W2, Y N2,i+1), (A3)
and
I(Y1,i;Y
N
2,i+1|W1,W2, Y i−11 ) = I(Y2,i;Y i−11 |W1,W2, Y N2,i+1), (A4)
(5) follows by the definition of J , and (6) follows by (A1). Letting  → 0, we get R1 ≤
I(U1;Y1|U2, Q)− I(U1;Y2|U2, Q).
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Moreover, note that
R1 −  ≤ 1
N
H(W1|Y N2 )
=
1
N
(H(W1)− I(W1;Y N2 ))
(a)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1;Y
N
1 )− I(W1;Y N2 )) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 )− I(W1;Y2,i|Y N2,i+1)) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 , Y N2,i+1) + I(Y1,i;Y N2,i+1|Y i−11 )− I(Y1,i;Y N2,i+1|W1, Y i−11 )
−I(W1;Y2,i|Y i−11 , Y N2,i+1)− I(Y2,i;Y i−11 |Y N2,i+1) + I(Y2,i;Y i−11 |W1, Y N2,i+1)) +
δ()
N
(b)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 , Y N2,i+1)− I(W1;Y2,i|Y i−11 , Y N2,i+1)) +
δ()
N
(c)
= I(W1;Y1,L|Y L−11 , Y N2,L+1, L)− I(W1;Y2,L|Y L−11 , Y N2,L+1, L) +
δ()
N
(d)
= I(U1;Y1|Q)− I(U1;Y2|Q) + δ()
N
, (A5)
where (a) follows by Fano’s inequality and Pe,1 ≤ , (b) follows from the similar Csisza´r’s
equalities of (A3) and (A4), (c) follows by the definition of J , and (d) follows by (A1). Letting
→ 0, we get R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|Q)− I(U1;Y2|Q).
Finally, notice that
R1 −  ≤ 1
N
H(W1|Y N2 )
=
1
N
(H(W1|Y N2 ,W2) + I(W1;W2|Y N2 ))
≤ 1
N
H(W1|Y N2 ,W2) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
(H(W1|Y N2 ,W2)−H(W1|Y N2 ,W2, Y N1 ) +H(W1|Y N2 , ,W2, Y N1 )) +
δ()
N
(e)
≤ 1
N
I(W1;Y
N
1 |Y N2 ,W2) +
2δ()
N
≤ 1
N
H(Y N1 |Y N2 ,W2) +
2δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Y1,i|Y i−11 , Y N2 ,W2) +
2δ()
N
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≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Y1,i|Y i−11 , Y N2,i+1, Y2,i,W2) +
2δ()
N
(f)
= H(Y1,L|Y L−11 , Y N2,L+1, Y2,L,W2, L) +
2δ()
N
(g)
= H(Y1|Q,U2, Y2) + 2δ()
N
, (A6)
where (e) follows by Fano’s inequality, (f) follows by the definition of J , and (g) follows by
(A1). Letting → 0, we get R1 ≤ H(Y1|Q,U2, Y2). Now the proof of R1 ≤ min{I(U1;Y1|Q)−
I(U1;Y2|Q), I(U1;Y1|Q,U2)− I(U1;Y2|Q,U2), H(Y1|Q,U2, Y2)} is completed. Analogously, we
can prove R2 ≤ min{I(U2;Y2|Q)−I(U2;Y1|Q), I(U2;Y2|Q,U1)−I(U2;Y1|Q,U1), H(Y2|Q,U1, Y1)}.
The proof of Theorem 4 is completed.
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